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A recent trend in the pharmaceutical industry has been for large pharma-
ceutical companies to acquire or merge with PBMs (prescriptionlpharmacy-
benets-management companies).1 Merck started this trend in November 1993
by merging with a PBM named Medco; two other pharmaceutical giants have
followed suit. Since such mergers are a recent phenomenon, their full-scale im-
plications are as yet unknown and there is little regulation in place specically
to address their potential eects. This essay describes the current state of af-
fairs of PBM-pharmaceutical company alliances and explores their implications
for the pharmaceutical and health care industries and the players involved. It
further discusses the regulatory bodies involved, the measures they have taken
to date, and possible future courses of action.
I. Describing the PBMs and the Mergers
A. The Structure and Function of PBMs
PBMs, or prescnptionlpharmacy-benets{management companies,2
operate with the goal of bringing health care to new levels of eciency in cost
and quality through management of the phannaceutical end of the business.
PBMs continue to exist outside of mergers with pharmaceutical companies, but
1This essay will use the terms merger, acquisition, vertical-integration, alliance, and re-
lated terms interchangeably to refer to the phenomenon of large pharmaceutical companies
buying PBMs.
2 FDA has a dierent term for PB Ms. calling them instead PMCs, or pharmacy
management companies.
1the biggest and most powerful are those that have merged.3
Employers and managed-care organizations hire PBMs to admin-
ister the pharmaceutical portions of their health care plans. There are certain
dening characteristics of PBMs. One central component is the maintenance
of an information database, which usually tracks physicians' prescriptions, the
drugs dispensed by pharmacists, and patterns of patient drug use for the pa-
tients who are covered under a plan the PBM is administering.4 The collected
information in the database enables PBMs to do drug utilization review, which
is an analysis of the data, revealing whether patients took their medications
regularly and as prescribed, whether there were any adverse interactions be-
tween drugs, other relevant patient health history information, and information
about doctors' patterns of prescribing.5 Such information could be invaluable
to pharmaceutical companies in deciding how to label, market , and improve
their products.
Another core characteristic of PBMs is their development and ad-
herence to formularies (lists of drugs approved for use by those participating in
the particular PBM's plan). PBMs decide which drugs to list on their formu-
laries based on cost and eectiveness considerations. There is a trend toward
including generics when feasible in order to save costs for plan sponsors.6 As this
3One source estimates that the three PBMs that have merged with pharmaceutical com-
panies, (Medco, PCS, and Diversied), comprise 80% of the managed drug benet market,
while over 35 other companies share the rest of the market. Doubts Emerge about Drug In-
durtiy Mergers; Acquiurions of Pharmacy Benet Managemem Companies Raise Antirrust
Concerns, Business & Health, Nov., 1994, at 53 Ihereinafter Doubts Emergej.
4Nancy A. Nichols, Medicine, Management, and Mergers: An Interview with Merck's P.
Roy VageLos, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 105, 111; Anita M. McGahan, Industiy
Structure and Competaive Advantage, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 115.
5McGahan, sup-a note 3, at 119-120.
6Nichols, sup-a note 3, at 110; McGalian, sup-a note 3, at 115, 119-120.
2essay will discuss, the close ties between merged PBM and drug companies may
aect the dynamic of the formulary, as the parent drug companies attempt to
ll as much as possible of their PBMs' formularies with their own products.7 As
part of the formulary system, PBMs pay pharmacists to call doctors who have
prescribed a particular drug to ask them to switch the prescription to one that
appears on the PBM's formulary, (which is usually a less-expensive alternative
drug).8
One further dening aspect of PBMs is their emphasis on long-
term health care, as exemplied by disease management (also called disease
state management) programs. These programs currently target people with
chronic diseases such as asthma and diabetes. Under such programs, pharma-
cists monitor patients' conditions, educate patients on proper medication usage,
and advise them on measures for promoting their overall health (diet~, exercise,
etc.). The goal is to invest the resources early in caring for such patients in
order to avoid the greater hospitalization costs that would accrue later if the
disease were not properly treated.9 Recent innovations in long-term care include
a capitation system, in which the plan sponsor pays a at fee for a given period
of time for drug coverage for all its constituents, rather than paying a per-drug
charge. Capitation is basically an insurance-type of risk-sharing, which will re-
quire a lot of data from the PBMs in order to gauge properly. A similar at-fee
7See, e.g., Doubts Emerge, sup-a note 2, at 53. One commentator armed, however, that
no one drug manufacturer could supply the full range of drugs to ll a formulary, and that
manufacturers need to get their products on more than one PBM's formulaiy, even with an
in-house PBM, in order to stay protable. id
8McGahan, sup-a note 3, at 119-120.
9Nichols, sup-a note 3, at 112; Greg Muirhead, The ABCs of PBMs; Pharmacy Benet
Managers Control
3system could be established for patients who have a particular disease and are
participating in a disease management program as well.10
B. Verncally-Inzegroied Phamiaceuncal Companies
Three of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. recently
each have acquired a major PBM. Merck and Medco merged in November, 1993,
starting the industry trend. Smithkline Beecham acquired Diversied Pharma-
ceutical Services in May 1994, followed by Eli Lilly's acquisition of PCS Health
Systems in July 1994. These mergers provide key advantages to pharmaceutical
companies: they provide an edge in the competitive drug industry, building in
eciencies that help the companies keep up with the demand for better health
care at lower prices that characterizes the new managed care frontier.11 a As
can be expected, the alliances provide drug companies with phenomenal access
to data, as well as shift their focus to ways of promoting long-term health.12
The mergers also provide important advantages to the PBMs involved Merged
PBMs have greater access to clinical resources, detail forces (salespersons who
tell doctors about new drugs), research and development budgets, and disease
management programs than do their
Phannacy industry, Drug Topics, Sept. 5, 1994, at 76. r non-
merged competitors.13 Vertically-organized pharmaceutical companies face spe-
cial challenges, however, in that they simultaneously serve four dierent cus-
10McGahan,sup-a note 3, at 121.
11Nicho~, sup-a note 3, at 106.
12Id at 106, 110.
13Lilly's $4 BIL Bid for PCS is Intermediate to Other PMuyouts, 43 F-D-C REP. (The
Green Sheet~), July 18, 1994, at 2.
4tomers: plan sponsors, pharmacists, physicians, and patients.14
II. Implications of the Mergers
A. How Mergers Aect the Various Players
1. Pharmacists
Pharmacists already were nding themselves at a crossroads in de-
termining what their role should be in the medical community when PBMs
added the job of requesting prescription-switches to the equation. Formerly
seeing themselves as counselors, pharmacists in recent years have been nding
their roles diminished even to the point of being mere drug dispensers. PBMs'
oers of payment to pharmacists who would call doctors and request switches
to formulary-listed drugs could be seen in one sense as a boon to the profession,
giving pharmacists a newly-increased role in health care management (and as-
sociated cost-containment eorts). Payments for asking patients to switch also
could be seen in this light, though perhaps less positively. There is also a more
troubling side to such practices. PBMs that are allied with drug companies
through mergers, or aliated with them more loosely by contract, may not be
promoting the drugs on their formularies solely for cost-erctiveness reasons,
but also for the purpose of increasing the sales of their companies' products.15
Such a scenario is problematic for a number of reasons. Serious ethical prob-
lems arise when pharmacists, who have been regarded as unbiased and detached
professionals, no matter what the details of their role, put themselves in the po-
sition of being deputies of the drug companies. An FDA Deputy Commissioner,
14Nichols, sup-a note 3, at 110.
15McGahan,supa note 3, at 115-116, 122-123; Gina Kolata, Company News: Upjohn to
Repay 8 States Over Drug Plan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1994, at Dl.
5Maiy l*ndergast, criticized such practices in a September 1994 statement, chal-
lenging PBM formularies as tool(sj for marketing, calling pharmacists entities
we thought were independent... [who] are really just agents of the drug compa-
nies and they are being paid to take the positions they take, and asserting that
these [arrangements] undermine trust in the health care system.16
Another problem with the switching system is that doctors may not
know that pharmacists are being paid to ask for the change in prescription.17
Such a situation carries over the ethical problems of pharmacists stepping out of
their neutral roles and into those of secret partisans and, in addition, imports a
risk in that doctors may think the pharmacist is calling because the substitute
drug has been shown more eective, and as a result may not pay due attention to
how safe or appropriate the substitution is for the particular patient or condition
to be treated. The latter risk was part of what was at issue when a number of
states investigated and ned the Upjohn company, (which is not merged with a
PBM, incidentally), for paying pharmacists to encourage doctors and patients
to switch from one of its diabetes drugs to another that was still under patent
The states charged that the company and the pharmacists failed to indicate that
this switch put patients at risk because the two drugs were not wholly equivalent
Upjohn claimed that it was paying pharmacists for counseling patients and not
for inducing them to switch.18
16Drug Firms and 'ALUetP PEM Structures Being Perused by FDA, Promotional Mate-
riaLs Topic of Meetings with Merck, Lilly, Smithkline Beecham, and Pzer, 56 F-D-C REP.
(The Pink Sheet), Oct. 17, 1994, at 8-9 [hereinafter Drug Firmsj.
17McCahan,sajp-a note 3, at 123.
18Id. at 123; Kolata, sup-a note 14, at Dl; Upjohn Violated State Business Practice Laws,
Marketletter, Aug. 8, 1994.
6One way to remedy the problem of doctors (and patients) not know-
ing that pharmacists are being paid to recommend drug switches simply would
be to require such disclosure on the part if the pharmacists. Advertisements and
articles in medical journals also would get the word out In addition, as a more
complete and permanent x, perhaps proof of actual counseling (which is what
the drug companies and associated PBMs claim pharmacists are doing now)
should be required. A counseling role, albeit funded by the drug companies and
so not wholly neutral, would give back to pharmacists a more important role in
health care. The counseling role for pharmacists that is envisioned and in place
under disease management programs could serve as a model for the type of coun-
seling pharmacists should perform.19 Pharmacists also have tossed their own
solution into the mix by forming their own PBM, called PDN (Pharmacy Direct
Network), which links community pharmacies and remains independent of drug
companies and their PBMs, thereby avoiding the ethical problems associated
with company payments for drug-switching.20
2. Physicians
The biggest impact on doctors from the mergers probably will come
from the information databases kept by the PBMs. Such databases have po-
tential for both good and bad. On one hand, the increased information about
how patients take their medications, the eects of the drugs, patient health his-
19Medco has instituted a two-phase Coordinated Care Network, which in its rst phase
gave pharmacists incentives for getting more formulary-listed drugs prescribed, and which
in its second phase gave pharmacists additional compensation for counseling and monitoring
patients. Perhaps a program like this is a good start in the direction of encouraging counseling
by pharmacists. Muirhead, sup-a note 8, at 76.
20Muirhead, sup-a note 8, at 76; Geo Walden, New Dynamics Emerge in Rx, Rx Mass
Market Retail Pharmacy, Chain Drug Rev., Aug. 29, 1994, at RX1.
7tories, and adverse drug interactions could greatly improve doctors' prescribing
approaches.21 At the same time, however, doctors may feel like Big Brother is
watching. Since a doctor~s prescribing habits are visible to anyone with access
to the database, such publicity could aect autonomy, discretion, and perhaps
even malpractice insurance. Further, PBMs can keep data, or even ratings,
on how receptive a particular doctor is to requests to switch.22 Such ratings
not only would be intrusive, but also may aect whether a particular doctor
is approved and covered under a particular health plan. If such were the case,
doctors would be forced to cave into requests to switch at the peril of losing
patients who are enrolled in the particular plan.
Another troubling potentiality of the new merged PBMs is that
they will oer incentives directly to doctors for prescribing drugs from their
formularies. Putting aside for the moment the complicated issue of unapproved
uses, hidden ties of doctors and drug companies have long been
~.- an issue and might become more problematic in the face of
vertical integration. Since doctors have been the traditional consumers to whom
prescription drugs were marketed, drug companies have a history of furnishing
doctors with gifts and other incentives, such as research grants, as a means of
getting doctors to notice and prescribe their products.23 PBMs with formulary
lists may make the drug company connection seem less evident to doctors and
21Doubts Emerge, sup-a note 2, at 53.
22McGahan,sup-a note 3,at 120.
23The FDA can regulate the content of promotions, but, according to an FDA spokeswoman,
Payment of a kickback for the prescribing of a particular product does not appear to be a vi-
olation of the [FD&CJ Act. Genemech Alleged Protropin Physician Inducemem of O-Label
Use Under FDA Investigation; Agency Has Limited Aathority over Foundations, Kickbacks,
56 F-D-C REP. (The Pink Sheet), Aug. 22, 1994, at 3-5.
8less to be guarded against. A doctor who lets her ethical guard down may end
up settling for prescribing a particular drug when a dierent one may be more
apt for a particular patient or condition. The patients would have no inkling of
the doctor's hidden ties with the drug company and would simply have to trust
that the prescription was appropriate.
3. Patients
The mergers may have positive and negative eects for the patients
covered. On the positive side, patients may be getting improved health care in
the sense that there would be increased education and supervision, perhaps
more accurate prescribing, and an emphasis on preventive measures and disease
management programs. Possible negatives include the loss of privacy associated
with information databases, the possibility that the formulary they are under
does not list the medicine that would best treat them, the lack of autonomy
(and truly informed consent) that is associated with the hidden ties between
drug companies, pharmacists, and doctors, and the lack of control in that plan
sponsors and drug companies and their PBMs are determining what is best for
the patients.
4. Plan Sponsors
In face of the mergers, plan sponsors will have to take extra care
and stay well-informed to ensure that their PBMs are still loyal to them and
are not just trying to promote sales of their parent drug companies' products.
Plan sponsors could safeguard themselves by monitoring the value, quality, and
eectiveness of the treatment their beneciaries are receiving. Threats to switch
9PBMs based on dissatisfaction with price, quality, or other factors may be ef-
fective, but become more problematic as most of the PBM power is concen-
trated in the three merged drug companies. Assurances by the merged PBMs
that their formularies are not restricted to partisan products, but list the most
cost-eective and quality drugs available may serve to ease the worries of plan
sponsors.24
5. Pharmaceutical Companies Not Merged With PBMs The PBM-
drug company mergers may have any of a number of eects on non-vertically-
integrated drug companies. The merged companies might hurt the non-merged
competitively, forcing them to negotiate contracts of aliation with non-merged
PBMs.25 Such contracts may become tougher to negotiate as more PBMs align
themselves in one way or another with drug companies, so the non-merged drug
companies should act quickly.26 A greater concern, and one which worries the
FDA, is that the non-merged companies will resort to questionable means of
inuencing prescribing and formularies as a way of gaining sales back from their
merged competitors.27 The FDA and other regulators will have to keep the
entire pharmaceutical eld in view when taking action to deal with the PBM-
pharmaceutical company mergers.
B. Other Implications of the Mergers
1. Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs
24A Merck spokesman is cited as insisting that Medco will provide the least expensive and
most appropriate medicine rega~lless of manuhcturer. Doubts Emerge, sup-a note 2, at 53.
25McGahan, sup-a note 3, at 120; Muirhead, sup-a note 8, at 76.
26Doubts Emerge, sup-a note 2, at 53.
27Marketitag Practices of Non-PBM Owning Companies Seeking Market Share Are An
Agency Concern{FDA's Pendergast, 56 F-D-C REP. (The Pink Sheet), Sept. 26, 1994, at 3
[hereinafter Marketing Practicesl.
10The FDA prohibits drug manufacturers from promoting their drug
products for unapproved uses. The situation becomes much less clear-cut in
regard to PBMs merged with drug compames. The PBM may want to embrace
the fact that doctors already are prescribing one of the company~s products for
an o-label use, or may want to encourage doctors to do so, but as the PBM
is now part of the entire drug company, this may not be permissible. In some
cases, it may be best for the patient if PBMs are allowed to encourage o-label
use since that may be the most eective (and perhaps least expensive) drug on
the market that can be used to treat the patieiWs condition. In other cases,
there may be reasons for caution. First, the PBM could be promoting a drug
for an o-label use not because it is more eective, but because it is made by
its parent company. Second, with its data-collecting eorts, a PBM might try
to run cheap, unocial tests (on unsuspecting patients) by widely encouraging
an unapproved use and then tracking the eects on patients. Such tests seem
unethical, but , on the other hand, if they could be done with patients' informed
consent they might be a way of collecting the data necessary for getting the drug
approved for the new use. Whether merged PBMs are entitled to list unapproved
uses on their formularies seems questionable. Even more dubious is the issue of
whether these PBMs can pay pharmacists to encourage switches from approved
drugs to unapproved uses of company or other formulary drugs.28
The FDA is concerned about the possible ties between drug man-
ufacturers, their acquired PBMs, and unapproved uses of the companies' prod-
281d
11ucts. Although the FDA is at an early stage in deciding how to regulate the
mergers, it has addressed questions to the merged drug companies, some of
which were specically aimed at nding out what kind of materials might be
used to promote o-label uses through PBMs.29 FDA has shown a commitment
to preventing advocacy of unapproved uses in drug company managed-care pro-
motional materials, even without a drug company-PBM merger. FDA sent Lilly
a warning letter over statements regarding unapproved uses that appeared in
a managed care binder promoting its drug Axid. The promotional materials
at issue dated from before Lilly had merged with PCS.30 Even in the absence
of FDA involvement, it seems likely that vertically-integrated drug companies
would set up some of their own precautions for staying within the law, such as
creating Chinese Walls between the drug manufacturing and PBM divisions of
the company.
2. New Drug Research vs. Push for Generics
There are some indications that the mergers may deter new drug
research. Merged drug manufacturers have new incentives to make generic drugs
in a wide range of categories now that they each have a special relationship with
a PBM and its formulary. If a company can ll a formulary with its own prod-
ucts, it can make money in a more certain way than through hit-or-miss new
drug research. As a result, some of the funds that had been used to develop
entirely new drugs may be diverted to the much simpler process of making me-
29Drug Firms, sup-a note 15, at 8-9.
30Lilly Axid for GERD Promotions to Managed Care Cited in FDA Warning Letter; Cost-
Eectiveness, Comparative Claims Also Deemed Misleading by the Agency, 56 F-D-C REP.
(The Pink Sheet), July 25, 1994, at 3-5 [hereinafter Lilly AxzdJ.
12too drugs.31 Additional incentive for manufacturing generics comes from the
fact that many patents will be expiring within the next ve years, opening the
eld for me-too drugs.32 Some argue that the rise of PBMs has intensied price
competition in the pharmaceutical industry, which will result in less prots and
accordingly less money for research and development.33 These fears all may
prove unfounded, however, particularly in the cases of the vertically-integrated
pharmaceutical companies. These companies are doing well in the competitive
eld, and have achieved much success and stature through their new drug dis-
coveries. One new drug probably can do a lot more to send a company's stock
prices soaring than a steady diet of generics. Further, these companies r un-
doubtedly recognize the value of new drugs to society, so whether for altruistic
reasons or more likely for public image reasons, the companies will continue to
invest in new drugs.34
3. Prescription vs. Over-the-Counter Status
The mergers may create incentives for keeping drugs under pre-
scription, as opposed to available over-the-counter (OTC), in that there is an
emphasis on information-collecting. Prescriptions serve the purpose of keeping
these drugs and their use on the record, producing data desired by the PBMs
and their parent pharmaceutical companies. Physicians and pharmacists prob-
ably also would favor keeping the status quo or converting even less drugs to
31NichoIs,sup~z note 3,at 111.
32McGahan,sup-a note 3, at 117.
33kL at 116, 123.
34Nichois, sup-a note 3, at 113. Merck's former CEO, P. Roy Vagelos predicted that Only
a few pharmaceutical companies will survive the restructuring that has already begun, and
the ones that do will have to excel at both research and the new distribution methods. Id
13OTC purely for business reasons. Plan sponsors, on the other hand, might pre-
fer if more drugs were changed to OTC since then they would not have to cover
their costs. If plan sponsors fully bought into the long-term health care idea,
however, they might not want such a change since patients may use medicine
more appropriately if it is prescribed and supervised. Drug manufacturers may
nd themselves torn on this issue between the desire for record-keeping, and the
wider distribution and greater sales that OTC status might provide.
III.Regulation and Regulatory Bodies
A.. Food & Drug Administration
The FDA is still in the early stages of deciding how to regulate
vertically-integrated pharmaceutical companies.35 It is gathering information
by addressing questions to the merged companies themselves. Chief areas of
concern seem to include independence between the drug companies and their
acquired PBMs, whether the acquisitions were designed to help sell the manu-
facturers' products, formulary decision-making, incentives to switch products,
product labeling and uses, unapproved uses, and data collection.36 The FDA
has authority over prescription drug manufacturers' promotional materials, and
aims to ensure accuracy, reliability, and balance of information.37 Judging from
its activities prior to the mergers, the FDA seems likely to take action in this
sphere. For example, the FDA had sent a warning letter to Upjohn regarding
the marketing of its diabetes drugs, (discussed above in section II.A.l), in which
35Marketing Practices, sup-a note 26, at 3; Drug Firms, sup-a note 15, at 8-9.
36Drug Firms, sap-a note 15, at 8-9.
371d See also Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 454, 459, 464
(2d. ed.
14it also mentioned the switching incentive program.38 FDA also issued a warning
letter involving Lilly's managed-care promotional materials which included un-
approved uses of its drug Axid (as discussed above in section [I.B. l).39 If these
prior activities are any indication, the drug-switching incentive programs and
the problem of unapproved uses encouraged by merged PBMs may be someof
the rsteects of the mergersthatFDA will target.
B. Federal Trade Commission
The FDA is not the only agency with jurisdiction over the impli-
cations of pharmaceutical company-PBM mergers. The FTC approves such
mergers and keeps a watchful eye out for antitrust problems and drug pricing.
While the FTC approved the Merck and Smithkline Beecham PBM acquisitions
without limitations, it has since imposed limits on Lill~s acquisition of PCS and
has now announced that it wi go back and examine the other two companies'
mergers. The FTC's concerns relating to Lilly were in ensuring that PCS carries
drugs made by Lilly's competitors, (in order to avoid driving out competition,
raising prices, and reducing quality and variety), and that Lilly not use its new
PBM to gain information about competitors' drugs. The measures the FTC
imposed include a requirement of an open formulary, approved by an
1991) independent committee, the creation of a re wall between
the drug manufacturing and PBM businesses (to keep competitors' condential
information, such as pricing, out of Lilly's view), and a requirement of FTC
clearance for future PBM acquisitions.40
38Kolata, sup-a note 14, at Dl.
39Lilly Axid, sup-a note 29, at 3-5.
40Anne E. Tergesen, Merck Put on Merger Hot Seat, Bergen Record, Nov. 8, 1994,
15C. Other Government Involvement
Members of Congress have carved out a role for themselves on the
issue of vertically-integrated pharmaceutical companies. Senators Howard Met-
zenbaum and David Pryor wrote to the FTC regarding the Lilly-PCS merger
asking for close scrutiny based on its potential implications for price competi-
tion.41 Representative Ron Wyden (and his Committee on Small Business) re-
quested a General Accounting Oce study of the mergers.42 State governments
have also gotten into the act. New York State, for example, through its Attor-
ney General investigated Upjohn's diabetes drug marketing and drug-switching
incentive program. The New York Attorney General also initiated legislation
making it illegal for companies to pay pharmacists to induce drug switches.43
One can expect more such activity on all fronts as the pharmaceutical market
further solidies.
IV.Conclusion
Mergers between large pharmaceutical companies and PBMs have
had and will have far-reaching implications that aect all the players in the
managed health care eld, and the pharmaceutical and health care industries
in general. While regulation thus far has been only preliminary, the full-scale
regulation that can be expected from several sources probably will serve to
check many of these eects. In the end, regulation may cut into many of the
at COl; Smithkline Beecham Diversied Takeover Under FTC Eye, Marketletter, Nov.
21, 1994.
41Lawmakers Eyeing Drug Networks, Health Legislation & Regulation, Nov. 2, 1994;
Tergesen, sup-a note39, at COl.
42Eyeing Drug Networks, sup-a note 40; Muirhead, sup-a note 8, at 76.
43Upjohn Violated State Business Practice Laws, sup-a note 17; Kolata, sup-a note 14,
at Dl.
16competitive advantages the drug companies had hoped to garner in entering
into such mergers.
17